TORTS--NEGLIGENCE-THE

COMMON LAW CATEGORIES OF TRES-

PASSER, LICENSEE, AND INVITEE THAT GOVERN A LANDOWNER'S

DuY

IN A PREMISES LIABILITY ACTION ARE REPLACED BY A SIN-

GLE STANDARD TO EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE AGAINST FoRE-

SEEABLE HARMS-Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426,

625 A.2d 1110 (1993).
Premises liability has been governed by a common law categorical approach for over a century.' Historically, a landowner's liability to an injured person depended on the classification of that
person as either a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. In today's more
1 John A. Bernardi, Comment, Loss of the Land Occupier's PreferredPosition-Abrogation of the Common Law Classifications of Trespasser, Invitee, Licensee, 13 ST. Louis U. LJ.
449, 450 (1969) (stating that common law categories existed well into the nineteenth
century to assist judges in determining a land occupier's liability for entrants). The
common law statuses for landowner liability were first introduced in the United States
in 1865. See Sweeny v. Old Colony & Newport R.R., 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 368, 372-73
(1865) (pronouncing and defining the injured person categories of invitee, licensee,
and trespasser); Recent Developments, 25 VAND. L. REV. 623, 625 & n.16 (1972) (stating that most courts in the United States adopted the common law classifications).
See infta notes 29-32 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of Sweeny.
New Jersey first recognized these categories in Fleckenstein v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. Fleckenstein v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 91 NJ.L. 145, 146-47, 102 A.
700, 700 (1917) (citation omitted). The plaintiff in Fleckenstein was a twelve year old
boy who entered the defendant's store with a friend, but had no intention of buying
anything. Id. at 146, 102 A. at 700. While in the defendant's store, the plaintiff was
injured when a flying fragment of metal struck his eye and blinded him. Id. The
majority acknowledged that the common law categories of trespasser, licensee, and
invitee governed landowner liability. Id. at 147, 102 A. at 700. Although recognizing
that merchants invite the public into their stores to purchase goods, the court labeled
the plaintiff a licensee because his only purpose was to accompany a friend, rather
than buy something. Id. at 146, 102 A. at 700. Therefore, the court affirmed a nonsuit because as a licensee, the defendant only owed the plaintiff a duty to abstain from
willful and wanton acts of negligence. Id. at 147, 102 A. at 701 (citing Delaware,
Lackawanna & Western R.R. v. Reich, 61 NJ.L. 635, 643, 40 A. 682, 685 (1898)).
2 Comment, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 426, 426 (1969). A trespasser is one who enters
another's property without permission or privilege to do so. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 329 (1965). Because the common law placed a high regard on property
ownership in an agrarian society, trespassers were given the least amount of protection. Scurti v. City of New York, 354 N.E.2d 794, 796 (N.Y. 1976) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, a landowner needed only to refrain from willful and wanton acts that
might injure a trespasser. Burton Constr. & Shipbldg. Co. v. Broussard, 273 S.W.2d
598, 603 (Tex. 1954); Renz v. Penn Central Corp., 87 NJ. 437, 461, 435 A.2d 540, 553
(1981) ("Traditionally, a landowner owed no duty to a trespasser other than to refrain
from acts willfully injurious.") (citations omitted); cf RESTATEMENT, supra, § 333 (stating that "a possessor of land is not liable to trespassers for physical harm caused by his
failure to exercise reasonable care" to make land safe or to conduct activities that are
nondangerous to such trespassers).
A licensee is one who enters upon the land for his own benefit and by an express
or implied invitation from the property owner. Hamilton v. Brown, 207 S.E.2d 923,
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complex and sophisticated society, however, such relationships are
not as easily defined.3 As a result, many jurisdictions have abolished the common law categories and replaced them with a single,
more flexible "reasonable care against foreseeable harms"
standard.4
925 (W. Va. 1974) (citing Wellman v. Christian, 126 S.E.2d 375, 379 (W. Va. 1962));
see also RESTATEMENT, supra, § 330 ("A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter or
remain on land only by virtue of the possessor's consent."). Persons labeled licensees
usually include social guests, loiterers, and salespeople. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 60, at 413 (5th ed. 1984). A landowner's

duty to licensees is to carry out activities on the land in a reasonably safe manner and
to warn of latent dangerous conditions. RESTATEMENT, supra,§§ 341, 342 (b). In New
Jersey, a licensee is afforded more protection than a trespasser, but must accept the
premises as they are maintained by the landowner. Berger v. Shapiro, 30 N.J. 89, 9697, 152 A.2d 20, 24 (1959). The landowner, however, must at least warn the licensee
of known latent dangerous conditions, although no inspection of the premises is required. Id. at 98, 152 A.2d at 25.
Finally, an invitee is one who enters the property by express or implied invitation
and for the benefit of the landowner. KEETON ET AL., supra, § 61, at 419. A property
owner who encourages the invitee to come on the property must make a reasonable
inspection of the property to discover defects and keep the property safe. Handleman v. Cox, 39 N.J. 95, 111, 187 A.2d 708, 716 (1963) (citations omitted); see also
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 343 cmt. b (asserting that a landowner owes an invitee assurance that the premises are safe for his visit). The Restatement of Torts classifies a
public invitee as one who is invited onto land held open to the public, and a business
invitee as one who is invited to enter land for business dealings. Id. § 332. The proprietor of the premises is required to make the property safe for doing business
"within the scope of the invitation." Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 275,
445 A.2d 1141, 1143 (1982) (citations omitted).
3 Bernardi, supra note 1, at 451; Carl E. Edwards, Jr. & Richard J. Jerome, Comment, Torts-Negligence-PremisesLiability: The ForeseeableEmergence of the Community Standard, 51 DENV. L.J. 145, 154-55 (1974) (explaining that as courts applied the rigid
categories, they began to have difficulty squaring each plaintiff into one of the three
labels); see, e.g., Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 272, 157 A.2d 129, 130 (1960) (stating
that a fire fighter is not a trespasser because he enters pursuant to a public right, and
is neither a licensee nor an invitee because he does not need permission to enter);
Benedict v. Podwats, 109 N.J. Super. 402, 408, 263 A.2d 486, 489 (App. Div. 1970)
(asserting that a relative who was asked to come to the defendant's home to perform
household chores was an invitee, rather than a social guest-licensee), affd, 57 N.J. 219,
271 A.2d 417 (1970); Tomsky v. Kaczka, 17 N.J. Super. 211, 213, 216-17, 85 A.2d 809,
810, 811-12 (App. Div. 1952) (pronouncing that an insurance agent summoned by a
landowner to collect an insurance premium was merely a licensee); Rottinger v.
Friedhof, 136 N.J.L. 422, 424-25, 56 A.2d 571, 572 (1948) (questioning whether an
automobile passenger is an invitee if the driver offered to give him a ride, or a licensee if the passenger solicited a ride from the driver).
4 See, e.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 98, 105 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (determining that common law classes should be cast aside when they no
longer work, and applying a duty of reasonable care to a building inspector who fell
on the greasy stairs of a restaurant); Webb v. City & Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731,
732-33 (Alaska 1977) (holding that because classical distinctions are no longer desirable in modern society, ordinary negligence principles govern a city's liability for a
pedestrian who stubbed her toe on a sidewalk and fell); Rowland v. Christian, 443
P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (stating that "[t]he common law rules obscure rather than
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illuminate" the landowner's duty, and that therefore a host must act reasonably in
light of the potential for injury to another); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489
P.2d 308, 309, 314 (Colo. 1971) (declaring that because common law classifications
should not be determinative, a property owner owed a duty of reasonable care to a
police officer injured when he stepped into a hole on the property); Pickard v. City &
County of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445, 445-46 (Haw. 1969) (holding that common law
distinctions for a standard of reasonable care do not apply when determining if a city
was liable for injuries to a patron who fell through a floor in the courthouse restroom); Keller v. Keller, 472 N.E.2d 161, 162-63 (I11.App. Ct. 1984) (noting that common law categories are no longer controlling; thus liability for a boy injured by a
hockey puck at his neighbor's home depended on the likelihood of injury, the scope
of the burden placed on the landowner, and the consequences of imposing such a
burden); Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 328 So. 2d 367, 367-68, 370-71
(La. 1976) (finding that the common law statuses are indeterminitive, and holding
the landowner liable for failing to use ordinary care to restrain a youth from touching
an electric wire on a utility pole located on the landowner's property); Limberhand v.
Big Ditch Co., 706 P.2d 491, 493, 498 (Mont. 1985) (imposing liability on a landowner, who had a duty to make the premises reasonably safe, for death of a youth who
drowned in an irrigation ditch); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 631-32 (N.H.
1976) (asserting that because special privileges afforded to landowners under common law classes are no longer warranted, a landowner was liable to a girl who injured
her hands and feet on burning rubbish); Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 529-31 (N.H.
1973) (holding a landlord liable for the death of a child who fell through stairs because rigid common law classifications perpetuate an illogical and artificial rule) (citation omitted); Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868, 869, 872 (N.Y. 1976) (pronouncing
that a landowner owes a single duty of care and may be liable for foreseeable injuries
to a motorcycle passenger resulting from an accident on the owner's property); Scurti
v. City of New York, 354 N.E.2d 794, 795 (N.Y. 1976) (determining that an ordinary
negligence standard governs liability of a landowner for injuries sustained by a boy
who was electrocuted by wires on a railroad car); Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc.,
333 A.2d 127, 128-29, 133 (R.I. 1975) (substituting a basic test of reasonableness for
the ancient common law categories when determining landowner liability for the
death of a child who drowned in water-filled holes dug by a land developer for septic
tanks).
A number ofjurisdictions, however, have only abolished the distinction between
an invitee and licensee. See, e.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
358 U.S 625, 626, 628, 630-32 (1959) (holding that a shipowner is liable for the injuries of a visitor who fell down steps because a single duty of reasonable care applies
for all lawful entrants under maritime law); Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla.
1973) (expanding the duty of reasonable care to licensees as well as invitees to hold a
landowner liable for a boy's death caused by an exploding bomb shelter); Gibo v. City
& County of Honolulu, 459 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Haw. 1969) (determining that the
defendant was liable for injuries sustained by a visitor who slipped and fell on a hospital floor because the plaintiff's presence on the premises was anticipated); Hardin v.
Harris, 507 S.W.2d 172, 173-75 (Ky. 1974) (holding that the liability of a landowner
for injuries suffered by a farmhand's son, who was run over by farming equipment,
depended on classifying him as licensee or trespasser, not as a licensee or invitee);
Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 848, 851 & n.5 (Me. 1979) (limiting reasonableness standard to licensees and invitees, both of whom enter under a right, to
render a college liable for the injuries of a student who fell on ice); Mounsey v. Ellard,
297 N.E.2d 43, 44, 51-52 (Mass. 1973) (following the modern trend of affording licensees and invitees a common duty of care to find a landowner liable toward a police
officer injured while delivering a summons); Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639, 64142 (Minn. 1972) (abolishing the traditional distinction between a licensee and an
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In a recent case, Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors,5 the NewJersey
Supreme Courtjoined a growing majority of states by changing the
common law categories governing landowner liability. 6 In rejecting the common law, the court adopted a single standard for
exercising reasonable care to protect against foreseeable harms.7
Applying this standard, the Hopkins court held that a real estate
broker owes a reasonable duty of care toward prospective buyers
and visitors at an open house, including a duty to inspect the premises and warn of any known dangers.8
In April 1987, Emily Hopkins attended an open house in
Plainsboro, NewJersey. 9 Hopkins was accompanied by her son and
daughter-in-law, who were househunting and had been invited to
visit the house by Fox & Lazo Realtors. 1" After they were greeted
by the broker's representative, Hopkins and her family inspected
the house on their own." While Hopkins waited in the family
room, her son and daughter-in-law wandered freely throughout
the house, patio, and outside grounds. 2 Upon their reentering
the house, Hopkins attempted to meet them in the foyer so they
could inspect the second floor together. 1 3 When leaving the family
room, however, she was unaware that there was a single step down
from the hallway to the foyer. 4 Hopkins contended that the step
was camouflaged because both levels of the floor were covered with
invitee when determining if a landowner was liable for the death of a social guest who
inhaled carbon monoxide); O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 747-48, 751-52 (N.D.
1977) (determining that there is no logical relationship between licensees, invitees,
and a person's safety, thus a landowner may be liable for an insurance agent's injuries
sustained when attacked by a dog); Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699, 700, 703-04
(Tenn. 1984) (holding that a host could be liable for a social guest's injuries because
the licensee-invitee distinction was no longer determinative in analyzing landowner
liability); Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 236 N.W.2d 1, 3, 11 (Wis. 1975) (stating that a
landowner is liable for the injuries of a social guest who slipped on an ice-covered
back porch because both licensees and invitees are owed a common duty of ordinary
care).
5 132 N.J. 426, 625 A.2d 1110 (1993).
6 Id. at 437-38, 625 A.2d at 1115-16. See supra note 4 for a list of those jurisdictions that have altered the common law premises liability categories.
7 Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 437, 625 A.2d at 1115.
8 Id. at 444-45, 625 A.2d at 1118-19.
9 Id. at 432, 625 A.2d at 1112.
10 Id.

11 Id. When the family first arrived at the open house, there was no one there to
greet them at the door. Id. When they entered the kitchen, the defendant's broker
welcomed them and allowed them to continue the inspection of the house by themselves. Id.
12 Id.
'3 Id.
14 Id.

1994]

NOTE

2231

the same pattern of vinyl floor covering. Unable to see the step,
Hopkins fell and fractured her right ankle.1 6
As a result of her injuries, Hopkins filed a negligence suit in
the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, against Fox & Lazo
Realtors.1 7 The complaint alleged that Fox & Lazo Realtors had a
duty to inspect the house and warn her of any known risks." The
trial court dismissed the complaint, positing that a real estate broker had no such duty.1 9
Reversing, the appellate division announced that a broker at
an open house assumed the position of the homeowner. 20 Relying
on the common law categories, the appellate court determined
that Hopkins was the equivalent of both an invitee and a licensee.2 1
Thus, because a homeowner owes a duty to inspect for and warn of
dangerous conditions, the court found that the broker could be
liable for Hopkins's injuries.2 2 The NewJersey Supreme Court sub2
sequently granted Fox & Lazo Realtors's petition for certification 1
24
to clarify the role of landowner liability in modern society.
Justice Handler, writing for the majority, affirmed the appellate division's holding and remanded the case for findings consistent with the opinion. 25 The justice recognized that the traditional
common law categories had been gradually changing and broadening into a general tort obligation. 26 Accordingly, the New Jersey
Id., 625 A.2d at 1112-13.
16 Id., 625 A.2d at 1113.
17 Id. at 433, 625 A.2d at 1113.
18 Id. Hopkins, following the common law categories, attempted to classify herself
as an invitee. Id. at 434, 625 A.2d at 1113. Asserting that the homeowner's residence
becomes the real estate broker's temporary place of business, Hopkins claimed that
she was a business invitee. Id., 625 A.2d at 1113-14. Fox & Lazo Realtors contended,
however, that the broker was merely an agent of the homeowner, and therefore owed
no duty to Hopkins. Id. at 435, 625 A.2d at 1114.
19 Id. at 433, 625 A.2d at 1113. The trial court, rejecting Hopkins's theory that she
was the equivalent of an invitee, held that the broker was not liable for injuries caused
by dangerous conditions on the property. Id. The trial court, however, did not require Hopkins to introduce expert testimony to establish a dangerous condition. Id.
20 Id. at 435, 625 A.2d at 1114.
21 Id.
22 Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 252 N.J. Super. 295, 302, 599 A.2d 924, 927
(App. Div. 1991), affd, 132 N.J. 426, 625 A.2d 1110 (1993). Accordingly, the court
remanded the case to determine the scope of the defendant broker's liability. Id.
23 Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 127 N.J. 567, 606 A.2d 377 (1992).
24 See Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 435, 625 A.2d at 1114.
25 Id. at 451, 625 A.2d at 1122.
26 Id. at 435, 625 A.2d at 1114 (quotations omitted). The majority acknowledged
that over time the common law evolves to address the changing policies and social
values of a growing society. Id. For example, in State v. Culver, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, addressing the flexibility and virtue of the common law, pronounced:
15
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Supreme Court adopted a single standard that required a landowner to exercise reasonable care to protect against foreseeable
harms. 2 7 In so doing, the majority concluded that it was reasonable for the trier of fact to find that Fox & Lazo Realtors breached
this duty and was therefore liable for Hopkins's injuries. 28
Developed in England, the common law categories defining
the relationship between a landowner and an entrant were not recognized in the United States until 1865 in Sweeny v. Old Colony &
Newport Railroad.29 In Sweeny, the defendant-railroad constructed a
plank for public passage across the railroad tracks, and maintained
a flagman at the plank to notify people when it was safe to cross.3 0
The plaintiff sued the railroad company for injuries sustained from
a collision between his wagon and a train, which occurred even
though the flagman had instructed that crossing was safe.3 1 After
describing the legal duties owed by a landowner to a trespasser,
licensee, and invitee, the Sweeny court held the defendant-railroad
liable because the plaintiff was an invitee, whom the defendant induced to cross over the premises. 32 The majority of state courts
The factors to be weighed in the balance in determining the present
course of the law include the reasons for the rule, the present requirements of the environment in which the rule is to be applied, the dangers incident to any change and the evils resulting from its continuance.
The power of growth is inherent in the common law.
State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 505-06, 129 A.2d 715, 721 (1957).
27 Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 438, 625 A.2d at 1115.
28 Id. at 449, 625 A.2d at 1121. The court affirmed the appellate court's remand,
however, stating that the issue of whether Fox & Lazo Realtors breached its duty to
Hopkins was one for the trier of fact to decide. Id.
29 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 368 (1865); Peter W. Agnes, Jr., Comment, 8 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 795, 796 (1974) (stating that Sweeny established the tripartite classifications of
entrants that were later adopted by the majority of American jurisdictions); Edward A.
Strenkowski, Note, Tort Liability of Owners and Possessors of Land-A Single Standard of Reasonable Care Under the Circumstances Towards Invitees and Licensees,
33 ARK. L. REv. 194, 195 (1979) (asserting that the Massachusetts Supreme Court in
Sweeny was the first in the United States to recognize the common law entrant
statuses).
30 Sweeny, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) at 369.
31 Id. at 369-70.
32 Id. at 372-73, 375-76. The court explained that a landowner owes no duty to
protect or provide safeguards for a trespasser. Id. at 372. Similarly, the court elaborated that a licensee who enters the property with permission, but not by invitation, is
required to accept the premises at his own risk. Id. at 372-73. Conversely, the majority noted, an invitee, who enters the premises by invitation, inducement, or allurement, i.e., such as from a store owner or inn keeper, is owed a duty of protection
against accident or injury. Id. at 373-74. The court's analysis of the plaintiff as an
invitee turned on the fact that the defendant-railroad was not passive in giving the
plaintiff a license or permission to use the crossing. Id. at 375-76. The defendantrailroad, the justice stressed, actually provided the crossing plank and the flagman,
and only allowed the plaintiff to cross when the flagman so indicated. Id.
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swiftly adopted these common law categories to establish land33
owner liability.
England, however, abolished the licensee-invitee distinction
through the enactment of the Occupiers' Liability Act (Act)3 4 in
1957.11 Specifically, the Act substituted a singular duty of care
owed to all lawful visitors in place of the common law duties owed
to an invitee and licensee.3 6 The Act, however, which did not modify the common law standard afforded trespassers, still requires the
English courts to determine whether an injured person is a trespasser or a licensee. 7
Only one year after England's passage of the Act, the United
States Supreme Court, in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlan33 Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 625 (stating that the common law classes
were quickly adopted by courts throughout the United States and continue in the law
today).
34 Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 31, § 2 [hereinafter Act].
35 Douglas Payne, The Occupiers'LiabilityAct, 21 MOD. L. REv. 359, 359 (1958) (asserting that "[t]he Occupiers' Liability Act ... makes important changes in the law
governing liability for injuries suffered on dangerous premises"). However, many
English courts reached unsatisfactory outcomes in distinguishing between liability for
conditions on land, when the categories were applied, and liability for activities performed on land, when ordinary negligence principles were employed. W.V.H. RocERS, WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ ON TORT 207 (13th ed. 1989). Rogers noted that the
common law was currently unsatisfactory because it was adopted at a time when negligence law was undeveloped. Id. As a result, the English legislature revised the categorical approach. Id. at 207-08. Section 2 of the Act specifically provides:
(1) An occupier of premises owes the same duty, the "common duty of
care", to all his visitors, except in so far as he is free to and does extend,
restrict, modify or exclude his duty to any visitor or visitors by agreement or otherwise.
(2) The common duty of care is a duty to take such care as in all the
circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that the visitor will be
reasonably safe in using the premises for the purposes for which he is
invited or permitted by the occupier to be there.
Act, supra note 34, § 2.
36 Act, supra note 34, § 2; see ROGERS FT AL., supra note 35, at 207-08 (pronouncing
that absent an express contract provision regarding safety, an occupier owes an implied single duty to both invitees and licensees under the Occupiers' Liability Act of
1957); Payne, supra note 35, at 359-60 (clarifying that the Act only affects the standard
of care owed to licensees and invitees, but makes no changes in regard to trespassers).
37 Payne, supra note 35, at 360 (emphasizing that the Act only improves the standard afforded a licensee, thus widening the gap between licensee and trespasser).
Moreover, Payne argued that the Act has drastically changed the law based only on a
few difficult cases. Id. at 373. For example, the commentator asserted that the law
was changed simply because the English courts had difficulty labeling social guests
and persons on public land as licensees or invitees. Id. (footnotes omitted). Rather
than eliminate the distinction between a licensee and invitee altogether, Payne argued that courts could simply promote a licensee to an invitee when the circumstances warranted. Id.
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39
tique,38 abolished the common law categories under maritime law.
In Kermarec, the Court faced the issue of whether the plaintiff, who
was permitted to board a ship to visit a friend, could recover for
injuries sustained when he slipped on an untacked canvas and fell
down a stairway. 4° The Supreme Court recognized that the common law distinctions were inherited from a society whose ideals
were strongly connected to the land and a history of feudalism.41
Maintaining that these ideals were no longer pivotal in a modern,
complex, industrialized society, the KermarecCourt held that a shipowner owed a single duty to exercise reasonable care to all lawful
boarders.4 2
In a continued attempt to reduce the harsh effects of the common law distinctions, modem courts began to carve out numerous
exceptions to the strict categorical approach.43 For example,

38 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
39 Id. at 630-31; Agnes,

supra note 29, at 800 n.26 (explaining that the Kermarec
Court declined to apply a licensee-invitee distinction because the common law classes
and their multitude of exceptions have spawned confusion and conflict) (quoting
Kermarec, 358 U.S. at 631); Robert M. Britton, Recent Developments, 14 VILL. L. REv.
360, 363 (1969) (stating that the Court in Kermarecabolished the common law distinctions between licensee and invitee because such classifications were adopted from a
legal system dependent on social statuses created by real property, a system that "was
alien to the sea"); John M. Devaney, Jr., Note, Holland v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad:
Defining A Landowner'sDuty to Trespassers in the Districtof Columbia, 31 CATH.U. L. REv.
591, 591-92 (1982) (noting that Kermarec represented a movement toward imposing "a
uniform standard of care toward all land entrants").
40 Kermarec, 358 U.S. at 626-27. Kermarec was delivering a package to a member of
the crew, who would pass it on to a mutual friend in France. Id. at 626. The crew
member had obtained permission for Kermarec's visit from an executive officer of the
ship. Id. Asserting that the canvas was negligently maintained, Kermarec sued the
shipowner for his injuries. Id. at 626-27.
Applying New York law, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
determined that Kermarec was a "gratuitous licensee" to whom the shipowner owed a
duty to warn of the dangerous condition. Id. at 627. Although the jury's verdict was
for Kermarec, the district court granted the shipowner's motion notwithstanding the
verdict because there was no proof that the shipowner knew that the untacked canvas
created a defective or dangerous condition. Id. at 627-28. The court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 628. The United States Supreme Court, however, determined that maritime law, rather than New York law, was controlling. Id. Positing that the common
law distinctions between an invitee and licensee were no longer useful, the majority
remanded the case for reinstatement of the jury's verdict. Id. at 630-32.
41 Id. at 630.
42 Id. at 632; see also Dayo 0. Onanubosi, Comment, Common Law Status Classifications: Duties Owed to Licensee and Invitee in Idaho, 29 IDAHo L. REv. 215, 221 (1992)
(noting that the United States Supreme Court's refusal to apply a licensee-invitee
distinction in admiralty law suggests a common law movement toward a single standard); Strenkowski, supra note 29, at 198 (asserting that the Kermarec Court was the
first to follow England's abolition of the invitee-licensee distinction).
43 Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 627 ("[T] he harsh, often unjust results of
applying the rigid common-law classifications .. .have engendered numerous excep-
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courts have sometimes treated visitors as if they were not actually
on the premises." Other courts have implemented the attractive
nuisance doctrine to protect children who wander onto the land of
another. 45 Additionally, under certain conditions, some courts
tions .... ."); Strenkowski, supra note 29, at 197 (noting that a "myriad [of] judicially
carved exceptions have arisen to the categories in order to mitigate their harshness");
see alsoJames A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreatfrom the Rule of
Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 510-11 (1976) (acknowledging that changes in social policies
forced the development of formal exceptions to the common law categories in order
to alleviate their harsh effects); Bernardi, supra note 1, at 454 ("In an obvious attempt
to avoid the general rules limiting liability, the courts have broadly defined numerous
exceptions
.");
Britton, supra note 39, at 361 (providing that "in response to
changing social mores, the courts have created exceptions to these restricted rules");
Edwards & Jerome, supra note 3, at 151-52 (explaining that due to the rigidity of the
tripartite classes and the development of negligence law, exceptions emerged to effectively redefine class members and the duty owed to them); Comment, The Common
Law Tort Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land: A Trapfor the Unwary, 36 MD. L. REv.
816, 823 (1977) [hereinafter Trap] ("The courts have also relied on legal fictions and
distinctions to mitigate harsh results [of the common law classifications]."); Comment,
supra note 2, at 427 (same); MarkJ. Welter, Comment, Premises Liability: A Proposal to
Abrogate the Status Distinctions of "Trespasser," "Licensee" and "Invitee" as Determinative of a
Land Occupier'sDuty of Care Owed to an Entrant, 33 S.D. L. REv. 66, 67-68 (1988) (noting
that duty regarding trespassers has been wrought with judicial exceptions).
44 Bernardi, supranote 1, at 454; see, e.g., Louisville & N. R.R. v. Anderson, 39 F.2d
403, 404-05 (5th Cir. 1930) (declaring that a lost traveler, who unknowingly strayed
from a public highway onto a private road and was injured, was considered to be on
the public highway if he was justifiably misled); cf Murray v. McShane, 52 Md. 217,
218, 228 (1879) (asserting that a person walking along a sidewalk, who was injured
when he stopped to rest on the defendant's stoop, may not have been a trespasser).
45 See Britton, supra note 39, at 361 (positing that a landowner is under a duty to
exercise due care toward a child trespasser who is induced onto the land by an attractive nuisance or artificial condition); see also Bernardi, supra note 1, at 454 (same);
Recent Developments, supranote 1, at 628 n.33 (same); Strenkowski, supra note 29, at
197 n.21 (same); Trap, supra note 43, at 823, 832-33 (treating children as constructive
invitees because, unlike trespassers, they cannot appreciate the risks of harm and
cannot reasonably be expected to protect themselves). The attractive nuisance doctrine was developed to protect children who, because of their age, could not appreciate the dangers of trespassing. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 59, at 399. The
landowner satisfies his duty by either eliminating the danger or by safeguarding the
child. Edwards &Jerome, supra note 3, at 153. Specific elements, however, must be
present before a landowner is subject to liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine. Welter, supra note 43, at 69-71. Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the land
occupier (1) created or maintained an artificial condition on his property; (2) knew
or should have known that such a condition created "an 'unreasonable risk of death
or serious bodily harm'" to the child; and (3) should have anticipated that a child
would enter the dangerous place. Id. at 70. In addition, a child must not have discovered the condition or appreciated its hazards, and the risk involved must outweigh
both the cost of eliminating the hazard and the benefit of maintaining the dangerous
condition. Id. at 70-71. This legal fiction, however, has been criticized for placing an
undue burden on landowners and restricting their freedom of land use. KEETON ET
AL., supra note 2, § 59, at 400.
The leading case in the United States that first articulated the attractive nuisance
doctrine was Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. Bernardi, supra note 1, at 454
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have transformed a frequent trespasser into a licensee in order to
raise the level of protection owed to such a person. 46 Furthermore,
n.32 (citing Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 21 Minn. 207 (1875)). The plaintiff in
Keffe was a seven year old boy who was attracted onto the defendant-railroad's property by an unsecured turntable. Keffe, 21 Minn. at 208-09. While playing on the equipment with his friends, the child's leg became caught, was injured, and eventually had
to be amputated. Id. at 209. The Keffe court held that the child was not a mere trespasser because the attraction of the plaything (turntable) to the child was the
equivalent of an express invitation to an adult to enter the property. Id. at 211. The
court, therefore, held the defendant-railroad liable because it was bound to use ordinary care to protect a child who was tempted onto its property. Id. at 212. This rule
was later codified in the Restatement of Torts. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 339
(asserting that a possessor of land is liable for physical harm to a trespassing child
caused by artificial, dangerous conditions if he knew or should have known that the
child would trespass, and that such condition posed an unreasonable risk of death or
serious bodily harm).
The NewJersey Supreme Court recognized liability for negligence to infant trespassers under the attractive nuisance doctrine in Simmel v. New Jersey Coop Co. Simmel
v. NewJersey Coop Co., 28 N.J. 1, 6, 143 A.2d 521, 523-24 (1958) (citation omitted).
The four year old plaintiff in Simmel was injured by a fire on the defendant's property.
Id. at 5, 143 A.2d at 523. The defendant argued that although he had recently acquired title to the property, he did not start the fire that attracted the children. Id. at
5-6, 143 A.2d at 523. Instead, the defendant asserted that other children, who cut
across the property to go to school, or the Department of Public Works, who deposited the debris on the property, were responsible for igniting the rubbish. Id. at 6,
143 A.2d at 523. justifying its reliance on the attractive nuisance doctrine, the court
noted that it is reasonably foreseeable that children, by nature, would be allured onto
the property. Id. at 7, 143 A.2d at 524 (quoting Diglio v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light

Co., 39 N.J. Super. 140, 141, 120 A.2d 650, 651 (App. Div. 1956)). The majority emphasized that because parents cannot always be with their children, "[t ] he doctrine
represents a prudent and essential accommodation of the landowner's right to the
use of his land and society's interest in the humane and the protection of the life and
limb of its youth and the individual's interest in personal security." Id. at 9, 143 A.2d
at 525 (quoting Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38, 45, 86 A.2d 777,
780 (1952)). Accordingly, the court held that where an owner of property is actually
aware that a certain condition exists on the property, he is liable for the harm it has
caused. Id. at 10, 143 A.2d at 526. The Simmel court, therefore, remanded the case to
determine the defendant's liability for the child's injuries. Id. at 13-14, 143 A.2d at
528.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently affirmed its belief in the attractive nuisance doctrine in DeRobertis v. Randazzo. DeRobertis v. Randazzo, 94 N.J. 144, 157, 462
A.2d 1260, 1267 (1983) (citation omitted). In DeRobertis, the defendant's dog bit the
five year old plaintiff. Id. at 147, 462 A.2d at 1261. The majority explained that under
the attractive nuisance doctrine, a possessor of land who maintains a dangerous condition on the property may be liable for a child's injuries because a child lacks sufficient knowledge to protect himself. Id. at 157, 462 A.2d at 1267. The DeRobertis court
remanded the case, however, to determine whether the plaintiff was actually invited
into the area where the dog was chained and the plaintiff was bitten. Id. at 160, 462
A.2d at 1268.
46 Bernardi, supra note 1, at 454. A landowner who makes no effort to stop a
constant trespasser from using a limited area of his property elevates the trespasser to
the status of a licensee because the landowner impliedly consents to the trespasser's
presence. Edwards &Jerome, supra note 3, at 153; see also Trap, supra note 43, at 831
(noting that the trespasser's status is reclassified when his presence is known to the
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other courts have distinguished between active and passive opera47
tions of the landowner in determining the negligence standard.
As these exceptions began to engulf the general rule,48 many
landowner); Strenkowski, supra note 29, at 197 n.24 (same); Recent Developments,
supra note 1, at 627 n.31 (same); cf RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, §§ 334-36 (asserting
that a landowner is liable for injuries to a constant or known trespasser resulting from
dangerous activities or artificial conditions existing on the property); Welter, supra
note 43, at 68 (defining the elements necessary to impose liability on a landowner for
injuries sustained by a frequent and known trespasser). As the concern for human
safety grows, the courts have held landowners liable for frequent trespassers because
the burden of safeguarding them is less than the risk of harm to which they are exposed. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 58, at 395-96.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the frequent trespasser exception in
Imre v. Riegel Paper Corp. Imre v. Riegel Paper Corp., 24 N.J. 438, 445, 132 A.2d 505,
508 (1957). The plaintiff, Joseph Imre, had travelled down to the bank of a river to
fish during his lunch hour. Id. at 441, 132 A.2d at 506. Unbeknownst to him, the area
around the lake was used by the defendant as a dumping area to incinerate waste. Id.
As Imre approached the water, he became submerged in hot embers. Id., 132 A.2d at
506-07. Although the trial court denied Imre recovery because as a trespasser he was
owed no duty, the supreme court accepted the Restatement's position that a constant
trespasser in a limited area must be protected from dangerous and artificial conditions on the land. Id. at 442, 445, 132 A.2d at 507, 509; RESTATEMENT, supra note 2,

§§ 334-338.
47 Britton, supra note 39, at 361; see also Trap, supra note 43, at 823 (clarifying that
courts afforded protection to trespassers depending on whether the negligence of the
landowner was classified as active or passive). Active negligence may result when a
landowner conducts a dangerous activity on his property. Scurti v. New York, 354
N.E.2d 794, 798 (N.Y. 1976) (citations omitted). Conversely, passive negligence may
occur when a landowner maintains a dangerous condition or some variation thereof,
including defective, inherent, obvious, or attractive conditions. Id. at 797-98 (citations omitted).
The New Jersey courts also made this distinction in Cropanese v. Martinez. See
Cropanese v. Martinez, 35 N.J. Super. 118, 122-23, 113 A.2d 433, 435 (App. Div.
1955). In Crapanese,the plaintiff, responding to the landowner's request to help him
erect a fence, sustained injury to his fingers. Id. at 119, 113 A.2d at 433. The law
division dismissed the plaintiffs complaint because he was a mere licensee, to whom
the defendant only owed a duty to refrain from willful and wanton acts of negligence.
Id. at 122, 113 A.2d at 435 (citations omitted). Distinguishing between liability for the
use and condition of the land and operations performed on the land, the appellate
division noted that the invitee-licensee distinction was indeterminitive. Id. at 122-23,
113 A.2d at 435. Therefore, the appellate court held that when a landowner asks
another to assist him in performing operations on the premises, the landowner owes a
single duty to use reasonable care regardless of the person's status. Id. at 124, 113
A.2d at 436.
48 Devaney, supranote 39, at 592 ("[T] he creation of such exceptions has produced
an inequitable, unpredictable, and often confusing body of law."); see also Henderson,
supra note 43, at 511-12 (asserting that both the social policies favoring accident victims and a growing view that a formalistic approach to legal thinking impedes justice
threaten the survival of the common law categories); Kathryn E. Eriksen, Comment,
Premises Liability in Texas-Time for a "Reasonable" Change, 17 ST. MARY's L.J. 417, 439
(1986) (concluding that controversy over common law classifications is due to: (1) a
philosophical shift in tort law that disfavors landowner immunity, (2) political, economic, and social growth away from feudal England, and (3) reevaluation of judge
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jurisdictions decided to abolish the common law categories,4 9 or to
and jury roles); Trap, supra note 43, at 835-36 (declaring that criticism of common law
is based on the fact that numerous exceptions foster confusion, and that modem
societal values are no longer rooted in feudal notions of property ownership).
49 See supra note 4 (listing jurisdictions that have abolished the common law categorical approach). These jurisdictions include: Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington D.C. See id. NewJersey recently became the next state to eliminate the common
law statuses. See Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 625 A.2d 1110 (1993).
The first fourjurisdictions to abolish the common law categories in their entirety were
California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, and New York. Carl S. Hawkins, Premises Liability After Repudiation of the Status Categories: Allocation ofJudge andJuiy Functions,
1981 UTAH L. REv. 15, 17. California was the first state to abolish the tripartite classifications in Rowland v. Christian. Id. at 16 (citing Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561
(Cal. 1968)). See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text for an analysis of Rowland
v. Christian.
Only three years after Rowland, Colorado followed suit in Mile High Fence Co. v.
Radovich. Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308, 314 (Colo. 1971). In Mile
High, Radovich, a police officer, followed a known prostitute and her suspected customer down an alley adjacent to the defendant's property. Id. at 309. On the property abutting the alley, the defendant-fence company was building a fence only seven
inches from the edge of the alley. Id. Due to poor lighting, Radovich did not see the
post holes dug by the defendant and broke his leg when he stepped into one. Id.
The lower court, sitting without a jury, held that the defendant negligently created a
dangerous condition on the property. Id. Mile High appealed the ruling, claiming
that Radovich was a mere licensee who entered the premises at his own risk. Id. at
310.
The Mile High court criticized the common law classes as contributing to confusion and judicial waste, and usurping the jury's fact finding function. Id. at 312 (citation omitted). Therefore, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the common law
categories would no longer determine a landowner's liability toward an entrant. Id. at
314. Instead, the court declared that "the occupant, in the management of his property, should act as a reasonable man in view of the probability or foreseeability of
injury to others." Id. In so doing, the supreme court affirmed the judgment below to
find that Mile High was negligent for failing to warn or protect Radovich from the
dangerous holes. Id. at 315; see also Edwards &Jerome, supra note 3, at 167-68 (asserting that although the Mile High approach "may necessitate some loss of certainty in
the gains achieved in terms of 'justice' and judicial methpremises liability cases ....
odology would seem to more than compensate for this loss"); Recent Developments,
supra note 1, at 639-40 (anticipating that many jurisdictions will follow Mile High).
ContraHawkins, supra, at 29 ("Colorado has, after repudiation of the status categories,
become entangled in confusing causation doctrines, and has used the rhetoric of
'proximate cause' both to withhold cases from juries and to give cases to juries without clear explanation of the legal limits of liability.").
The District of Columbia, the third jurisdiction to abrogate the common law classifications, addressed the issue in Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc. Smith v.
Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 99-100 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Smith, a health
inspector, was injured when he slipped on the greasy stairs in the defendant's restaurant. Id. at 98. The purpose of the inspection was to determine if the kitchen was
adequately repaired after a grease fire. Id. When the jury found for the defendantrestaurant, Smith moved for a new trial, alleging that the jury erroneously labelled
him a licensee rather than an invitee. Id. at 98-99.
The D.C. Circuit noted the awkwardness of fitting modem relationships into
eighteenth century common law classifications when determining premises liability.
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eliminate the distinction between invitees and licensees. 50 To date,
Id. at 99. Therefore,joining the modern trend, the majority pronounced that a landowner's liability would be guided by ordinary negligence principles. Id. at 100. The
Smith court specifically defined its new standard as follows: "[a] landowner must act as
a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of
all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of
the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk." Id. But see Devaney, supra note 39, at
592-93 (noting that the District of Columbia's highest state court failed to adopt
Smith's reasonable man standard, although it had an opportunity to do so in Holland
v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 431 A.2d 597 (D.C. 1981) (en banc)); Hawkins, supra,
at 30 (pointing out that the District of Columbia has been cautious in applying Smith
and reluctant to include trespassers); Commentary, 25 ALA. L. REv. 401, 414-15
(1973) (questioning whether the uncertainty of a vague reasonableness standard articulated in Smith will lead to legal chaos).
A final case of importance is Basso v. Miller, in which New York abolished the
common law statuses. Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872 (N.Y. 1976). Stephen
Basso accompanied William Miller on his motorcycle to the scene of an accident
where a man had fallen into a crevice on the defendant's property. Id. at 869. After
Basso and Miller assisted in the rescue, they climbed on the motorcycle and proceeded to leave. Id. Because of holes in the parking lot, Miller lost control of the
motorcycle and Basso was thrown off onto some rocks. Id. The Basso court recognized that nearly twenty years had passed since England and the United States
Supreme Court had abolished the common law distinctions. Id. at 871 (citations
omitted). Therefore, the court adopted the single standard of care set forth in Smith,
and noted that the tripartite classes should only be one factor considered in determining whether the defendant acted reasonably. Id. at 872; see Hawkins, supra, at 24
& n.76 (commenting that because New York never recognized the attractive nuisance
doctrine, the paramount effect of the abolition of common law classes since Basso has
been to aid infant intruders). But cf Trap, supra note 43, at 822 (criticizing the Basso
court for not adequately discussing the evidentiary implications of abolishing the
common law categories).
50 See supra note 4 (discussing cases in which courts have abolished the distinction
between an invitee and licensee). These states include: Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky,
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. See id.
In 1959, the United States Supreme Court, in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique,lead the way in abolishing the distinction between an invitee and licensee at maritime law. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S.
625, 630 (1959). See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
case. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Mounsey v. Ellard, was among the first
jurisdictions after Kermarec to eliminate the licensee-invitee distinction. Mounsey v.
Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (Mass. 1973). In Mounsey, the plaintiff police officer entered the defendant's property to deliver a criminal summons regarding a parking
violation. Id. at 44. As the police officer attempted to leave, he slipped and fell on
ice, which had accumulated outside the defendant's door due to a defective drainage
system. Id. The police officer requested that the court abolish the artificial common
law classifications and treat public employees as a separate class of entrants who were
owed a duty of reasonable care to maintain safe premises. Id.
After a detailed analysis of the Massachusetts courts' struggle with the common
law categories, the majority abolished the licensee-invitee distinction and adopted a
single standard of ordinary negligence. Id. at 45-51. The court reasoned that use of
the common law categories, which relied on the fact that imposing duties to inspect
and protect sparse land settlements from entrants was not burdensome, no longer
made sense in a modem, industrialized society. Id. at 51. The Mounsey court clarified,
however, that while the classifications would no longer be the sole factor used to de-
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however, only one state has modified the categories by statute. 5 1
The first state to abolish the entrant statuses was California in
termine liability, the foreseeability of an entrant's presence and the time, place, manner, and circumstances surrounding his entrance would still be relevant. Id. at 52. A
reasonable care standard, the court posited, would give the jury the needed flexibility
to fix the burdens of liability. Id. at 53. Applying this new analysis, the Mounsey court
held the defendant liable for the police officer's injuries. Id.; see Agnes, supranote 29,
at 814-15 (viewing Mounsey as "illustrative of the growing judicial willingness to discard
impractical and inequitable fictions in favor of viable and just remedies[,]" as well as
"dethron[ing] a score of confusing, irrational and inconsistent cases which have
lingered on, under the guise of stare decisis"); Mark A. Peterson, Note, Liability of
Owners and Occupiers of Land, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 609, 621-22 (1975) (suggesting that
Mounsey would ease the decision-making process by including some foreseeable trespassers, such as constant trespassers, within the class of persons to whom a duty of
reasonable care is owed).
Wisconsin similarly modified the common law classes regarding invitees and
licensees in Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 236 N.W.2d 1, 11
(Wis. 1975). The plaintiff in Antoniewicz arrived at the defendant's home to give the
defendant's daughter a ride to a friend's house. Id. at 3. The defendant was aware
that the area behind the home was covered with ice. Id. The plaintiff, not informed
of the icy conditions, fell and injured himself. Id. The defendant contended that
because the plaintiff was only a licensee, and that the slippery back porch was not a
hidden danger, he owed no duty to the plaintiff. Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
declined to abolish all the categories because no trespasser was involved in the case.
Id. at 5. Acknowledging the difficulty in distinguishing between an invitee and a licensee, and the absence of a sound rationale for denying recovery in certain cases, however, the majority announced that an ordinary negligence standard should be
afforded to both invitees and licensees. Id. at 10-11; see Peterson, supra, at 625 (claiming that abolition of all the common law distinctions would not significantly change
liability in other areas of Wisconsin law).
Finally, in O'Leary v. Coenen, North Dakota also eliminated the licensee-invitee
distinction. O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 751-52 (N.D. 1977). Helen O'Leary,
an insurance agent, entered Coenen's farm attempting to sell Coenen insurance. Id.
at 747. Although the Coenens were not home, their dog ran out of the house and
chased O'Leary all the way to her car before biting her. Id. at 747-48. O'Leary sued
the Coenens to recover medical expenses incurred from the dog bite. Id. at 748. The
trial court identified O'Leary as a "bare licensee," who need only be protected from
willful and wanton acts of negligence or traps on the premises. Id. The North Dakota
Supreme Court, however, chose to impose a single duty of reasonable care on the
landowner for both invitees and licensees. Id. at 751. Accordingly, the court reversed
the dismissal of O'Leary's complaint and remanded the case to determine whether
the Coenens knew of the dog's behavior patterns and acted reasonably under the
circumstances. Id. at 752. Noting that a significant difference between licensees and
trespassers still existed, however, the majority maintained the common law rules and
exceptions regarding trespassers. Id. at 751 n.6; see Strenkowski, supranote 29, at 210
(requesting that the Arkansas Legislature, after an analysis of the North Dakota
Supreme Court's discussion in O'Leary, respond to present day societal needs by enacting a statute adopting a single standard of care).
51 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557a (West 1991). The statute provides that "[t]he
standard of care owed to a social invitee shall be the same as the standard of care
owed to a business invitee." Id. Similar to England's Occupiers' Liability Act, the
Connecticut statute does not directly address the duty owed to trespassers. Recent
Developments, supra note 1, at 629 n.41.
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5 2 The plaintiff in Rowland, a social guest at
Rowland v. Christian.
the defendant's apartment, sustained hand injuries from a broken
sink faucet.5 3 Declaring that the common law categories were only
one factor to be considered, the Rowland court announced that liability is based on whether the landowner acted as a reasonable person in light of the likelihood of injury to another person.5 4 The
court reasoned that the value of a person's life or limb does not
vary with his relationship to the landowner. 55 This kind of classifi52 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968); see also Hawkins, supranote 49, at 22 (noting that
"California became the first jurisdiction to repudiate the status rules in favor of a
general standard of reasonable care"); Bernardi, supra note 1, at 455 (declaring California as "the first state to expressly abolish the historical categorization of a landowner's limited duty to those entering upon his land"); Britton, supra note 39, at 360,
362 (same); Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 630 (same).
53 Rowland, 443 P.2d at 562. Specifically, Rowland severed the tendons and nerves
in his right hand. Id. A month prior to Rowland's visit, Christian had informed her
landlord of the broken faucet handle. Id. Rowland sued Christian, alleging that the
broken fixture was a dangerous condition that Christian had a duty to warn him of or
repair. Id. Christian asserted, however, that Rowland was a mere licensee to whom
she owed no duty to warn about obviously dangerous conditions like the broken faucet. Id. at 562-63.
54 Id. at 568. The Rowland court, therefore, reversed the lower court's decision
and held Christian liable for her guest's injuries. Id. at 569.
One justice, dissenting from the majority opinion, argued that the traditional
categorical approach was both workable and reasonable. Id. (Burke,J., dissenting); cf.
Henderson, supra note 43, at 513 (clarifying that the Rowland standard still requires
the fact finder to take the landowner-entrant relationship into account, but that this
relationship will neither be controlling nor conclusive); Comment, supra note 2, at
431-32 (describing that the Rowland standard may put a financial burden on landowners through increased insurance premiums). The justice articulated a fear that a case
by case analysis based on ordinary negligence principles will lead to the imposition of
unlimited liability regardless of how the plaintiff entered the property. Rowland, 443
P.2d at 569 (Burke,J., dissenting). The dissent stressed that only the legislature had
the duty to effect such sweeping modifications of tort law. Id.; cf Bernardi, supra note
1, at 458 (suggesting that other jurisdictions may choose to only eliminate the licensee-invitee distinction, rather than immediately accept the California result); Hawkins, supranote 49, at 22-23 (noting that subsequent California decisions indicate that
the determination of landowner liability has not been completely left to the jury, i.e.,
the status rule still applies to fire fighters, police officers, and persons who enter for
recreational use). Contra Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 631-32 & n.59 (noting that cases subsequent to Rowland have approved and accepted the single
standard).
55 Rowland, 443 P.2d at 568. The majority buttressed its reasoning by citing the
California Civil Code § 1714, which was in existence since 1872, and provides in pertinent part:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but
also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or
skill in the management of his property or person, except as far as the
latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon

himself....
7
Id. at 563-64 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1 14(a) (West 1985)). This statute, the Row-

land court articulated, reflected the state's basic policy regarding who should be liable
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cation, the majority commented, contradicts humanitarian values
56
and modern social mores.
New Jersey, however, continued to adhere to the strict common law classifications governing landowner liability for ten years
before and after Rowland1 7 For example, in Snyder v. I. Jay Realty
Co., 8 a plaintiff sustained injuries when he fell through a hole in
the floor of the defendant's factory building. 9 In analyzing the
building owner's liability, the supreme court recognized that New
Jersey had consistently adhered to the common law categories that,
the court argued, were sufficiently flexible in a modern society.6"
Moreover, the Snyder court asserted that the use of predictable categories facilitated the distinction between the jury's function and
the judge's role in premises liability actions. 61 Thus, the court held
for the injuries of another. Id. at 568. But see Comment, supra note 2, at 432 (suggesting that jurisdictions that do not have a similar statutory provision may distinguish
Rowland).
After performing an extensive analysis of the common law duties owed to each
class and recognizing the numerous exceptions that had developed, the majority concluded that the common law distinctions were no longer justified or workable in modern society. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564-67; see also Britton, supra note 39, at 367
(submitting that the Rowland approach will eliminate the need to make tenuous distinctions to fit a plaintiff into a certain class in order to be protected).
56 Rowland, 443 P.2d at 568. Continuing to follow the ancient categorical approach, the court emphasized, would lead either to injustice or the development of
more legal fictions to avoid harsh results. Id.
57 See, e.g., Snyder v. I.Jay Realty Co., 30 N.J. 303, 311, 153 A.2d 1, 5 (1959); Caroff
v. Liberty Lumber Co., 146 N.J. Super. 353, 358, 369 A.2d 983, 985 (App. Div. 1977).
58 30 N.J. 303, 153 A.2d 1 (1959).
59 Id. at 309, 153 A.2d at 4. The plaintiff accompanied a friend to his job at a
factory building. Id. at 308, 153 A.2d at 3. While assisting his friend in loading a
carton onto his truck, the plaintiff fell into a recess in the floor. Id. at 309, 153 A.2d at
4. The plaintiff was not aware of the opening in the floor because the light in the
building was not working and the inside of the building was very dark. Id.
60 Id. at 311, 153 A.2d at 5. ContraRowland, 443 P.2d at 567 (stating that "it is clear
that [the] distinctions are notjustified in the light of our modem society and that the
complexity and confusion which has arisen is ... due to the attempts to apply just
rules in our modem society within the ancient terminology"). See supra notes 52-56
and accompanying text for further analysis of Rowland
61 Snyder, 30 N.J. at 311-12, 153 A.2d at 5. The court emphasized that it is the jury's
function to determine only disputed questions of fact. Id. at 312, 153 A.2d at 5. But
see Bernardi, supranote 1, at 455 (explaining that the Rowland court's approach shifts
the determination of liability from the judge to the jury because the judge no longer
dismisses a case based on pigeonholing the plaintiff into one of the common law
categories); Comment, supra note 2, at 431 (positing that the jury, rather than the
judge, will now consider whether the defendant conformed to the standard); Welter,
supra note 43, at 87 (maintaining that adoption of a negligence standard allows ajury
to consider a plaintiff's motives and the circumstances surrounding his entrance, regardless of the financial relationship between the parties or the landowner's implied
or express consent); see also Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29
COLUM. L. REv. 255, 279 (1929) (emphasizing that the judicial process in analyzing
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that the jury could properly determine whether the plaintiff was a
licensee whose presence the defendant should have reasonably
anticipated.6"
Almost one decade after Rowland, the New Jersey Superior
Court, Appellate Division, in Caroff v. Liberty Lumber Co.,63 reevalu-

ated the common law entrant categories. 4 The court addressed
the issue of whether a state park ranger was an invitee or licensee
when he entered land pursuant to a legal privilege. 65 The trial
negligence cases has the greatest flexibility); Hawkins, supra note 49, at 21-22 (asserting that the fear of losing control of the jury is unwarranted because control devices
under general negligence will effectively limit landowner liability); Edwards & Jerome, supra note 3, at 165-66 (arguing that a community standard allows the jury to
impose ideals of contemporary society when determining liability, but may also bring
uncertainty and bias); Eriksen, supranote 48, at 450-51 ("[Slubmitting the case to the
jury has not relieved the plaintiff of the burden of proving which a duty existed that
the defendant allegedly breached, thus causing plaintiffs injury."); Peterson, supra
note 50, at 626-29 (offering a variety of jury instructions that would be suitable for
premises liability cases); Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 636 (explaining that
under a community standard a landowner will be found liable more often because
meritorious claims will reach the jury rather than be discarded on the basis of a per se
classification).
62 Snyder, 30 N.J. at 314, 153 A.2d at 7 (citation omitted). The court argued that a
jury could determine that the building owner should have reasonably anticipated that
visitors of employees would use the back entrance because of its convenience and the
fact that there were no signs posted to the contrary. Id. (citation omitted). Conversely, the majority noted that the jury may determine that the location of the back
entrance was such that no one should reasonably anticipate that it would be used as a
reception entrance. Id. at 314-15, 153 A.2d at 7 (citation omitted). Regardless of the
outcome, the majority declared, it is the jury's duty to weigh the evidence and inferences. Id. at 315, 153 A.2d at 7 (citation omitted).
Three justices dissented in part from the majority's decision for varied reasons.
Id. at 318-19, 153 A.2d at 9-10 (Burling,J., dissenting in part and concurring in part);
id. at 319-20, 153 A.2d at 10 (Jacobs & Schettino, J.J., dissenting in part). The first
dissent argued that because it was unreasonable for the jury to find that the building
owner should have anticipated employee visitors, the plaintiff should be treated as a
trespasser. Id. at 319, 153 A.2d at 9 (Burling, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part). The second dissent suggested, however, that the tenant, as well as the building
owner, should be liable for the plaintiff's injuries because the tenant did not warn the
plaintiff, who was legally on the premises, of the hidden danger. Id. at 319-20, 153
A.2d at 10 (Jacobs & Schettino,J.J., dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
63 146 N.J. Super. 353, 369 A.2d 983 (App. Div. 1977).
64 Id. at 355, 369 A.2d at 984.
65 Id. The defendant-lumber company leased the property where the injury occurred from the state for the purpose of salvaging timber. Id. A portion of the property was reserved for a state ranger station and personal quarters. Id. Both the
lumber company and the state ranger used the same roadway for ingress and egress.
Id. The defendant's heavy equipment caused large ruts to develop in the road; the
defendant filled these ruts with a type of sawdust that became very slippery when wet.
Id. at 355-56, 369 A.2d at 984. Even though the ranger knew of the slippery condition
and exited with caution, he fell and seriously injured his knee while patrolling his
assigned area of the park. Id. at 356, 369 A.2d at 984.
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judge dismissed the plaintiffs complaint, analogizing the plaintiff
to a police officer or fire fighter and thus finding him a licensee, to
whom the defendant owed no duty. 6 6 The plaintiff urged, however, that the historical distinctions should be abolished and replaced with a single duty of reasonable care and foreseeability of
harm under all circumstances.6 7 The Caroff court recognized that
the rigid rules governing landowner liability, adopted in the eight68
eenth century, were awkward when applied in modern society.
The appellate division declined to abolish the common law categories, however, relying on the New Jersey Supreme Court's adherence to such distinctions in Snyder.6 9 Reversing the trial court, the
appellate division then concluded that the plaintiff was the
equivalent of an invitee.7 °
For unknown reasons the trend of abolishing the common law
distinctions of trespasser, licensee, and invitee came to a halt in the
66 Id. at 356-57, 369 A.2d at 985. The court denied recovery because the ranger, as
a licensee, admitted that he knew of the dangerous condition. Id.
67 Id. at 357, 369 A.2d at 985. In support, the plaintiff cited at least three cases
from other states that abolished the common law classes due to the difficulty of categorizing a public official. Id. (citing Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97,
98, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (determining that common law classes should be cast aside
when they no longer work and holding that building inspector who fell on greasy
stairs of restaurant is owed duty of reasonable care); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich,
489 P.2d 308, 309, 314 (Colo. 1971) (declaring that a property owner owed a duty of
reasonable care to a police officer injured when he stepped into a hole on the
owner's property because common law classifications should not be determinative);
Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 44, 51-52 (Mass. 1973) (following the modern trend
of affording licensees and invitees a common duty of care to conclude that a landowner was liable to a police officer injured while delivering a summons)). See supra
notes 49-50 for a discussion of these cases.
68 Caroff, 146 N.J. Super. at 358, 369 A.2d at 985 (citing Arbaugh's Restaurant, 469
F.2d at 99-100).
69 Id.; see Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 30 N.J. 303, 311, 153 A.2d 1, 5 (1959) (declaring
that the common law approach to landowner liability is sufficiently flexible to meet
present day needs). See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Snyder.
70 Caroff, 146 N.J. Super. at 361, 369 A.2d at 987. The Caroff majority stressed that
there was no rational reason or public policy concern to justify denying a public employee the same level of protection afforded an invitee. Id. The court specified that
the factual circumstances surrounding the injury, rather than just the plaintiffs status
as a public official, is the determining factor when analyzing a landowner's liability.
Id. at 360, 369 A.2d at 986. To support its position, the majority relied on the Restatement of Torts, § 345(2), which provides:
The liability of a possessor of land to a public officer or employee who
enters the land in the performance of his duty, and suffers harm because of a condition of a part of the land held open to the public, is the
same as the liability to an invitee.
Id. at 360, 369 A.2d at 986 (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 345(2)). Because
the plaintiff was an invitee, not a licensee, the appellate division remanded the case
for a new trial. Id. at 361, 369 A.2d at 987.
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1970s.7 1 In Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors,72 however, the New
Jersey Supreme Court revisited the issue in a premises liability case
to determine whether a realtor owed a duty to a visitor at an open
house. 73 The court first analyzed the purpose and efficacy of the
common law classifications.7 ' Next, the majority examined the
court's role in modernizing the law and defining the standard.7 5
Finally, the court addressed the necessity of expert testimony to
establish a dangerous condition. 76 This detailed analysis led the
NewJersey Supreme Court to conclude that the common law classifications regarding landowner liability towards an entrant should
be changed.7 7
Beginning the court's opinion, Justice Handler acknowledged
that traditionally a landowner's liability was dependent upon the
classification of the injured person in relation to the property.7 8
71 KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 62, at 433 & n.7 (noting that "all six courts passing on the issue from [1979] until 1982 have reaffirmed their commitment to the
traditional trespasser-licensee-invitee classification scheme"); Jason S. Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Economic Analysis of Legal Form, 76 CORNELL L.
REv. 341, 394 (1991) (asserting that the Rowland trend has started to reverse because
judges are dissatisfied with the uncertainty of leaving the decision to ajury); Hawkins,
supra note 49, at 17 (positing that since 1981, fifteen states have refused to overrule
the status classifications).
72 132 N.J. 426, 625 A.2d 1110 (1993).
73 Id. at 431-32, 625 A.2d at 1112. Specifically, the court determined whether a
real estate broker had a duty to warn potential buyers of dangerous conditions on the
property. Id. at 431, 625 A.2d at 1112.
74 Id. at 433-39, 625 A.2d at 1113-16.
75 Id. at 43949, 625 A.2d at 1116-21.
76 Id. at 449-51, 625 A.2d at 1121-22.
77 Id. at 435-38, 625 A.2d at 1114-15.
78 Id. at 433, 625 A.2d at 1113; see also Hawkins, supra note 49, at 15 (maintaining
that historically, the status of the entrant on the property gauged a landowner's liability); Henderson, supra note 43, at 510 (same); Bernardi, supra note 1, at 450 (same);
Britton, supra note 39, at 360 ("In light of the high regard placed on private property
rights by early English and American thought, the common law courts developed
rules designed to limit a landowner's liability for negligence.") (footnote omitted);
Devaney, supra note 39, at 595 (noting that the common law classes developed largely
as a result of the societal dominance of landowners); Edwards & Jerome, supra note
3, at 145 (pronouncing that common law rules fashioned the duty of a landowner
based on the plaintiff's relationship to such landowner as a trespasser, licensee, or
invitee); Eriksen, supra note 48, at 421 (recognizing that a landowner maintained a
privileged status well into the nineteenth century); Comment, supra note 2, at 426-27
(same); Onanubosi, supra note 42, at 216 ("[I]t is believed that the distinctions were
maintained because of 'the high place which land has traditionally held in English
and American thought and still the continuing dominance and prestige of the landowning class in England during the formative period of the [nineteenth century].'");
Peterson, supra note 50, at 609 (stating that the common law classes were based on
the premise that a landowner had no duty to protect those who came onto his land
without a legal right or permission); Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 623-24
(claiming that entrant classifications were first pronounced during an era when a
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The court noted that the historical categories were limited to trespasser, licensee, and business invitee. 7 9 The majority observed that
under these categories the strictest duty, owed to an invitee, was to
inspect the premises to discover obvious, dangerous conditions."0
landowner's privileged status was well accepted); Welter, supranote 43, at 67 (same);
Commentary, supranote 49, at 402-03 (positing that nineteenth century common law
courts imposed liability on a landowner depending on his visitor's status in relation to
the land).
79 Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 433, 625 A.2d at 1113 (citing Snyder v. I.Jay Realty, 30 N.J.
303, 311, 153 A.2d 1, 5 (1982)). Justice Handler recognized that a landowner is only
required to warn a trespasser of highly dangerous artificial conditions on the land. Id.
at 434, 625 A.2d at 1113 (citing Renz v. Penn Cent. Corp., 87 N.J. 437, 461, 435 A.2d
540, 553 (1981) (stating that because a trespasser is afforded the least protection, a
landowner is only required to refrain from willful acts of negligence)). The presence
of a licensee or social guest, the court contrasted, places the landowner under an
obligation to warn about hidden defects of which the landowner is aware. Id. (citing
Berger v. Shapiro, 30 N.J. 89, 97-98, 152 A.2d 20, 24-25 (1959) (announcing that a
licensee is slightly more protected than a trespasser in that he is owed a duty to be
warned, but must still take the premises as they are maintained)) (other citations
omitted). Finally, the majority posited that an invitee is owed a duty to be safeguarded from dangerous conditions on the property that the landowner knows about
or should discover upon inspection. Id. (citing Handleman v. Cox, 39 N.J. 95, 111,
187 A.2d 708, 716 (1963) (asserting that a landowner must inspect the premises and
make them safe because an invitee, who is on the premises for the property owner's
benefit, enjoys the most protected status)) (other citations omitted). See supra note 2
and accompanying text for further discussion of these classifications.
80 Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 434, 625 A.2d at 1113 (citing Handleman, 39 N.J. at 111, 187
A.2d at 716; Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 275, 445 A.2d 1141, 1143
(1982)) (other citation omitted). The court relied on two NewJersey Supreme Court
cases, Handleman v. Cox and Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., and the Restatement of Torts
to define a duty owed to a business invitee. Id. (citations omitted). In Handleman v.
Cox, the NewJersey Supreme Court addressed the issue of the duty owed to a salesperson who enters the defendant's place of business. Handleman, 39 N.J. at 98-99, 187
A.2d at 709-10. In that case, the plaintiff, a salesperson from the Senak Corporation,
entered the defendant's diner to collect a monthly installment payment from one of
the defendant's employees. Id. at 98-99, 187 A.2d at 709. The defendant was well
aware that the company's salespeople consummated sales at the diner with his employees. Id. at 99, 187 A.2d at 710. On the date in question, the plaintiff was instructed to enter from the rear doorway. Id. at 100, 187 A.2d at 710. As the plaintiff
entered, he fell down a set of stairs that were blocked from his view by boxes. Id. at
101, 187 A.2d at 710.
The trial court in Handleman dismissed the plaintiffs complaint, finding that he
was a trespasser because he entered through the rear of the building. Id., 187 A.2d at
711. On appeal, the appellate division found the plaintiff to be a licensee, but concluded that the defendant had not breached a duty owed to him. Id. at 102, 187 A.2d
at 711. The supreme court concluded, however, that ajury could find that the plaintiff was a licensee or an invitee. Id. In so finding, the majority posited that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to reasonably inspect the premises for defective
conditions. Id. at 111, 187 A.2d at 716 (citations omitted). Therefore, the court articulated that the jury could find that the boxes blocking the stairs created an unreasonable risk of injury to the plaintiff. Id.
More recently, in Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., the NewJersey Supreme Court analyzed the liability of a store owner for injuries to a patron intentionally inflicted by a
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Accordingly, the court analyzed the parties' attempts to fit
themselves within these categories.8 1 Emphasizing that common
law rules may evolve over time to reflect changes in public policy
and social values, Justice Handler attested that the traditional classifications for landowner liability were no exception. 2 The court
stressed that the industrialization and modernization of our comthird party. Butler, 89 N.J. at 274, 445 A.2d at 1142. In Butler, a mugger attacked a 60
year old woman in the parking lot of the defendant's store. Id. The plaintiff sued the
store, claiming it was negligent for failing to provide a safe parking lot and to warn
her of the known danger. Id. Although the jury awarded the plaintiff $3600, the trial
court granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant. Id. at 275,
445 A.2d at 1143. The appellate division reversed the trial court's decision, finding
that it was not unreasonable to require the store owner to provide protection against
crime for his customers. Id. (quotation omitted). Affirming the appellate division's
ruling, the Butler court postulated that "[tihe proprietor of premises to which the public is invited for business purposes of the proprietor owes a duty of reasonable care to
those who enter the premises upon that invitation to provide a reasonably safe place
to do that which is within the scope of the invitation." Id. (citations omitted). Based
on the defendant's awareness that criminal acts were occurring on his property and
that the store was therefore in the best position to provide protection and warnings,
the court imposed liability on the store owner for the plaintiffs injuries. Id. at 275,
284, 445 A.2d at 1143, 1148; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 343(a) (imposing
landowner liability for injuries to invitees from known or discoverable dangerous
conditions).
81 Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 434-35, 625 A.2d at 1113-14. Hopkins, in following the common law categories, attempted to classify herself as an invitee. Id. at 434, 625 A.2d at
1113. Asserting that the homeowner's residence becomes the real estate broker's
temporary place of business, Hopkins claimed she was a business invitee. Id. at 43435, 625 A.2d at 1113-14. Fox & Lazo Realtors, however, contended that the broker
was merely an agent of the homeowner and, therefore, owed no duty to Hopkins. Id.
at 435, 625 A.2d at 1114.
82 Id. (citations omitted). Specifically, the majority explored the roots of the strict
common law classifications. Id. at 436, 625 A.2d at 1114. The court recognized that
because pastoral and agrarian ideals were highly valued in the early 1800s, courts
aimed to protect the landowners' paramount right to use and enjoyment of their
property. Id. (citations omitted); see Bernardi, supra note 1, at 450-51 (recognizing
the "early concept of property ownership that the property owner was sovereign
within his own boundaries and as such might do as he pleased within his own domain"); Charles P. Dribben, Comment, The Outmoded DistinctionBetween Licensees and
Invitees, 22 Mo. L. REv. 186, 187 (1957) (asserting that in the nineteenth century
"unrestricted uses of property were uppermost over human welfare"); Green, supra
note 61, at 271 (stating that no group of ideals has been more strongly supported by
the courts than the landowner's rights); Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 624
(recognizing that nineteenth century judges were reluctant to allow jurors to classify
landowner liability because they were typically potential entrants).
The Hopkins court acknowledged that an essential character of the common law
is its flexibility and adaptability to changes in society. Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 435, 625
A.2d at 1114 (citing State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 505, 129 A.2d 715, 721 (1957)). For
example, the court cited State v. Culver for the proposition that "'[t]he power of
growth is inherent in the common law.'" Id. (citing Culver, 23 N.J. at 506, 129 A.2d at
721).
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plex society no longer loaned itself to such rigid categories."3 The
court acknowledged that a majority ofjurisdictions had either abolished the categories8 4 or at least eliminated the slight distinction
between a licensee and invitee.8 5
Furthermore,Justice Handler concluded that attempting to fit
parties into these outdated categories would lead to awkward and
strained results. 8 6 The majority opined that the analysis of liability

should not focus on a framework of classifications, but on whether
83 Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 436, 625 A.2d at 1114. The court noted that as the economies of England and the United States became more dependent on capitalism, property rights became less important. Id. Moreover, the majority in Hopkins recognized
the gradual changes in society's views regarding landowner liability. Id. at 435-36, 625
A.2d at 1114 (citing Butler, 89 N.J. at 277, 445 A.2d at 1144 (asserting that common
law classifications are gradually changing in favor of a single standard of reasonable
care to protect against foreseeable harms); Renz, 87 N.J. at 462, 435 A.2d at 553 (recognizing well-established exceptions to landowner liability concerning trespassers);
Caroff v. Liberty Lumber Co., 146 N.J. Super. 353, 357, 369 A.2d 983, 985 (App. Div.
1977) (asserting that other jurisdictions have not had difficulty imposing a single duty
of care to all entrants)).
84 Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 437, 625 A.2d at 1115 (citations omitted). For a listing of
the cases on which the Hopkins court relied, see supra note 4.
85 Hopkins, 132 NJ. at 437, 625 A.2d at 1115 (citations omitted).
86 Id. at 438, 625 A.2d at 1115. See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 62, at 432
(criticizing the common law classification scheme for being unduly complex, harshly
mechanical, and overly protective); Johnston, supra note 71, at 380 (criticizing the
traditional categorical approach as both underinclusive and overinclusive); Britton,
supra note 39, at 362 (recognizing the inconsistency of the rationale of labelling an
entrant as an invitee or licensee); Dribben, supra note 82, at 189 (attacking the common law categorical approach by stating that "if liability cannot be established by a
certain legal principle it cannot be established at all") (quotation omitted); Edwards
& Jerome, supra note 3, at 145 (acknowledging that from the beginning the courts
had difficulty comfortably fitting plaintiffs into the classes); Eriksen, supra note 48, at
423-24 (noting that attempting to label every conceivable plaintiff as one of the three
common law statuses was difficult and often lead to harsh results); Comment, supra
note 2, at 427 (asserting that exceptions have led to a "patchwork of legal classifications" which are "by no means uniformly interpreted"); Onanubosi, supra note 42, at
219 (criticizing common law classifications as rigid, complicated, and inequitable);
Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 627 (same); Strenkowski, supra note 29, at 197
("[R] igid application of the categories often produces confusing, unjust, and undesirable results."); Trap, supra note 43, at 816 (noting that exceptions to common law
classifications have led to inequitable and harsh decisions); Welter, supra note 43, at
76 (stating that public officers and public employees do not fit into the traditional
common law categories); Commentary, supra note 49, at 403 ("Rigid application of
these categories in specific cases led to inequities .... ").
The Hopkins court noted that the appellate division had found it difficult to fit
Hopkins, a visitor but not a prospective purchaser at the open house, into one of the
common law categories. Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 438, 625 A.2d at 1115. The appellate
court, the majority observed, first analogized the broker to the homeowner. Id. (citation omitted). Holding that Hopkins was within both the status of a licensee and
invitee, the court acknowledged that the broker owed a combined "duty of a social
host and of [an] occupier-invitor." Id. (quoting Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 252
N.J. Super. 295, 302, 599 A.2d 924, 927 (App. Div. 1991)).
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the relationship of the parties in the surrounding circumstances
makes it fair and just to impose such a duty.87
The court next examined the fairness of imposing a single
standard of care.8 8 Historically, thejustice asserted, the function of
the courts was to determine tort liability.8 9 Elaborating that a
court's formulation of a standard is ultimately a determination of
fairness, the court enumerated several factors that should be considered: the parties' relationship; the kind of risk involved; the ability and opportunity to exercise care; and the public's interest in
imposing such a duty.9 0 As a result, the majority defined the process as a fact sensitive analysis.9"
In addition, Justice Handler examined the specific nature of
the broker-client relationship.9 2 Due to the substantial economic
benefits gained by the broker and the reliance by the customer on
the broker's expertise, the majority concluded that the broker's invitation to the customer implied an obligation to protect his safety
87 Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 438, 625 A.2d at 1115; see Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89
N.J. 270, 279, 445 A.2d 1141, 1145 (1982) (holding that it is fair that a store bear the
costs of its negligent failure to protect a customer from the criminal acts of a third
party in the store parking lot). See supra note 80 for further discussion of Butler.
88 Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 439, 625 A.2d at 1116 (citation omitted).
89 Id. (citing Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 552, 476 A.2d 1219, 1226 (1984)). In
Kelly v. Gwinnell, the NewJersey Supreme Court was faced with imposing liability on a
social host for injuries suffered by a third person as a result of an automobile accident
with an intoxicated guest. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 540-41, 476 A.2d at 1220. Although there
was no current legislation addressing a social host's duty, the Kelly court pronounced
that in negligence cases it is traditionally the role of the court to determine the scope
of a duty. Id. at 552, 476 A.2d at 1226. The court therefore imposed liability on the
host for the third party's injuries, finding that its decision was consistent with legislative policy against driving while intoxicated. Id. at 548, 551-53, 476 A.2d at 1224, 1226.
90 Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 439, 625 A.2d at 1116; see also Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J.
469, 485, 524 A.2d 366, 374 (1987) (asserting that the courts have "refrained from
treating questions of duty in a conclusory fashion recognizing that, '[w]hether a duty
exists is ultimately a question of fairness.'") (quoting Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of
Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (1962)) (other citations omitted).
91 Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 439, 625 A.2d at 1116. The justice emphasized that the
resultant duty must "fairly resolve the specific case and generate intelligible and sensible rules to govern future conduct." Id.
92 Id. at 439-42, 625 A.2d at 1116-17. The Hopkins majority identified the common
aspects of a broker's job to include suggesting the open house to the homeowner,
managing and directing the open house inspection, advertising the event by posting
signs, inviting potential purchasers, and extending personal invitations to enter the
property. Id. at 439-40, 625 A.2d at 1116. The combination of these actions, the court
concluded, reasonably implies an invitation to enter the property. Id. at 440, 625 A.2d
at 1116. The court also specified that the realtor presents himself or herself to the
public as a salesperson with expertise in real estate transactions. Id. (citing Farrell v.
Janik, 225 N.J. Super. 282, 288-89, 542 A.2d 59, 62 (Law Div. 1988)). This expertise,
the majority emphasized, allows the potential purchaser to rely on the broker when
examining the premises. Id.
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while on the premises.9 3 Accordingly, the court pronounced that
both the homeowner and the broker share a responsibility to safe4
guard the visitor.1
Once a duty of care is triggered, the majority explained, the
scope of that duty must be determined.9 5 The court recited several
factors to be considered when determining the scope of the dutythe nature of the invitation, the risk of the activity, and the fairness
of imposing the duty. 9 6 Elaborating further on the essential question of what the realtor can do tp satisfy the duty, Justice Handler
propounded that a broker's familiarity with the premises is heavily
contingent on his opportunity to inspect the premises before the
open house.9 7 The court concluded, therefore, that an adequate
inspection should include an examination of the house to ascertain latent defects affecting its salability, as well as those characteristics that a typical purchaser would examine. 9 8 The majority
eliminated from the broker's duty, however, the obligation to warn
93 Id. at 441, 625 A.2d at 1117. The economic benefits the broker receives from an
open house, the majority articulated, include earning commissions from the sale, cultivating future clients, and discussing alternative listings. Id. Therefore, the court
determined that the relationship between a broker and customer during an open
house inspection was substantial. Id.
94 Id. at 442, 625 A.2d at 1117. Although Fox & Lazo Realtors argued that the risks
of hosting an open house are already placed on the homeowner, the court rejected
this contention. Id. at 441-42, 625 A.2d at 1117. Positing that the open house visitor
becomes an invitee through the broker's invitation, the court concluded that a duty
of care is owed by both the broker and the homeowner. Id. at 442, 625 A.2d at 1117
(citation omitted). The majority asserted that because the homeowner and the broker share the benefits of the open house, they also share the attendant duties. Id. To
support its conclusion, the majority recognized its previous holdings that imposed
concurrent duties. Id. (citing Klinsky v. Hanson Van Winkle Munning Co., 38 N.J.
Super. 439, 442-43, 450, 119 A.2d 166, 167-68, 171-72 (App. Div. 1955) (imposing duty
on both the athletic association, who sponsored the softball game, and the amusement park, where the game was held, for the safety of a patron-employee), certif denied, 20 N.J. 534, 120 A.2d 661 (1956)).
95 Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 442, 625 A.2d at 1117.
96 Id. (citing Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291,
293 (1962)).
97 Id. at 442-43, 625 A.2d at 1117-18. The court pronounced that the extent of the
broker's duty to prevent the risk of harm to a visitor turns on the foreseeability of
injury and the practicability of preventing harm. Id. at 443, 625 A.2d at 1118. The
justice stressed that the court must rely on "fairness, common sense, and morality" to
establish the limits of a broker's liability. Id. (citing Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476
A.2d 1219 (1984)); see also People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail, 100 N.J.
246, 262, 495 A.2d 107, 115 (1985) (defining duty as the "knowledge of the risk of
harm or the reasonable apprehension of that risk").
98 Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 444-45, 625 A.2d at 1118-19. The majority specified that
typical features of which a visitor would expect a broker to have knowledge of included fire and burglar alarms, locks, and defects such as broken steps, frayed electrical wires, and weak or missing railings. Id. at 444, 625 A.2d at 1118.
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against unknown dangers that are not revealed by his or her own
inspection. 99
The court further asserted that striking a balance between the
broker's economic benefit from the open house and the imposition of a duty to inspect was fair and reasonable."' Noting that the
actual homeowner is primarily liable, and that the broker may have
a right to contribution or indemnification from the homeowner,
the majority suggested that the broker could protect against dangerous conditions more effectively than the homeowner.'
Therefore, the public's interest would be served, the court emphasized,
because requiring such an inspection will discourage negligent
1 2
conduct in accordance with the main purpose of tort law.'
Finally, the majority addressed the requirement of providing
expert testimony to establish a dangerous condition.1 0 3 Justice
99 Id. at 445, 625 A.2d at 1119. Continuing an analysis of the broker's duty, the
justice carefully explicated that the duty was not as comprehensive as a homeowner's
duty towards an invitee. Id. The court clarified that the homeowner's duty is broader
than the broker's duty because the owner is more familiar with any hidden dangers
and has a continuing responsibility to keep the premises safe. Id. The justice also
emphasized that the broker only has a brief opportunity to inspect the house. Id. As
such, the court specifically stated that the broker is not an insurer of the safe condition of the property. Id. Concluding, the court described the broker's duty as being
in the middle of a spectrum, bound on one end by the homeowner's duty and on the
other end by no duty at all. Id. at 446, 625 A.2d at 1119 (citations omitted).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 446-47, 625 A.2d at 1119-20 (citations omitted). The court pointed out
that NewJersey statutes may allow the broker to be indemnified by, or acquire a contribution from, the homeowner for any liability for a visitor's injury. Id. at 447, 625
A.2d at 1120. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-1 to -4 (West 1987) (defining the rights
and obligations among joint tortfeasors); see also Holloway v. State, 125 NJ. 386, 40001, 593 A.2d 716, 723 (1991) (stating that the purpose ofJoint Tortfeasors Contribution Law is to prevent a plaintiff from arbitrarily selecting a victim and to promote the
sharing of the burden of liability) (citations omitted); Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco.,
81 NJ. 548, 566, 410 A.2d 674, 684 (1980) (asserting thatJoint Tortfeasors Contribution Law prevents one tortfeasor from paying for another tortfeasor's pro rata share
of the judgment) (citations omitted); Alder's Quality Bakery, Inc. v. Gaseteria, Inc., 32
NJ. 55, 77, 159 A.2d 97, 108 (1960) (illustrating who can be a joint tortfeasor under
the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law). The visitor's comparative negligence may
also mitigate the broker's liability. Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 447, 625 A.2d at 1120 (citation
omitted); see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to 5.2 (West 1987) (defining the applicability of the doctrine of comparative negligence).
102 Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 448, 625 A.2d at 1120 (citations omitted). The majority
stressed that preventing accidents and determining tortious behavior are the main
purposes of tort law. Id. (citations omitted). The law seeks to discourage negligence
and promote reasonable conduct, the court articulated, without foreclosing on a
plaintiff's redress. Id. (citing People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail, 100
NJ. 246, 255, 495 A.2d 107, 111 (1985)).
103 Id. at 449, 625 A.2d at 1121. The justice noted that at trial, Hopkins attempted
to establish the dangerous condition of the camouflaged step by using photographs
and the testimony of a layperson. Id. In contrast, the court noticed that Fox & Lazo
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Handler explained that expert testimony is only required when jurors are unable to evaluate a condition due to lack of experience.10 4 The court conceded, however, that tripping on a step that
is not perceived to be there is not beyond the realm of a juror's
understanding.1" 5 As a result, the justice held that Hopkins was
not required to retain an expert to establish a prima facie case re10 6
garding a dangerous condition.
Accordingly, the NewJersey Supreme Court replaced the common law categories governing landowner liability with a single duty
of reasonable care to protect against foreseeable harms.10 7 Specifically, the majority held that a real estate broker owes a reasonable
duty of care toward prospective buyers.1" 8 The Hopkins court announced, however, that its revolutionary holding would be applied
prospectively.10 9
Justice Clifford filed a brief concurrence, disagreeing with the
majority's need to reevaluate and change the existing common law
categories. 1 10 The concurring justice interpreted the majority's poRealtors provided the expert testimony of an architect who claimed that the use of the
same patterned floor covering on both levels did not make the connecting step dangerous. Id. Both the trial court and the appellate division, the majority recognized,
allowed Hopkins to establish a prima facie dangerous condition without the use of
expert testimony. Id.
104 Id. at 450, 625 A.2d at 1121 (quoting Wyatt by Caldwell v. Wyatt, 217 N.J. Super.
580, 591, 526 A.2d 719, 725 (App. Div. 1987)). Justice Handler agreed with the dissentingjustice that the dangerousness of a condition will vary with the myriad situations that pose hazards to persons on property. Id. (citing Hopkins, 132 NJ. at 454-55,
625 A.2d at 1123-24 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting)).
105 Id., 625 A.2d at 1121. Therefore, the majority left it to the jury to conclude
whether or not the step was dangerous. Id. at 451, 625 A.2d at 1121-22.
106 Id., 625 A.2d at 1122. However, Fox & Lazo Realtors, the court stated, was not
precluded from producing expert testimony proposing that the step was not dangerous. Id.
107 Id. at 442-43, 625 A.2d at 1117-18.
108 Id. The majority, therefore, remanded the case to allow the "trier of fact [to] ...
determine whether under the circumstances of this case the broker breached a duty
to Mrs. Hopkins." Id. at 449, 625 A.2d at 1121.
109 Id. at 449, 625 A.2d at 1120-21. The court proffered, however, that Hopkins was
permitted to benefit from the decision because she took the initiative to bring suit.
Id., 625 A.2d at 1121 (citation omitted).
110 Id. at 451, 625 A.2d at 1122 (Clifford, J., concurring). Justice Clifford admitted
to being caught in the middle of the majority's position and the dissent's hysteria. Id.
Specifically, the justice pronounced that he was "(c] aught between a rock and a hard
place-the rock of the Court's somewhat complex explication of the real-estate broker's duty, and the hard place of the dissent's near-hysterical forecast of doom, despair, destruction, and the demise of Western civilization . . . ." Id.
The concurring justice noted that the changes the majority implemented were
"no big deal" because they were severely limited as to whom the duty applied (visitors
at an open house) and what the duty entailed (warning of known dangerous conditions). Id. at 451-52, 625 A.2d at 1122 (Clifford, J., concurring).
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sition as complicating a simple case."' Therefore, although agreeing with the majority's standard and conclusion, Justice Clifford
was content to apply the reasoning of the appellate division's
12
opinion.'
Justice Garibaldi, however, authored a critical dissent that disapproved of the majority's abandonment of the common law categories because it was expansive, vague, and ambiguous. 13 The
dissent pronounced that the majority's imposition of a duty on the
broker was unreasonable, impractical, and unnecessary because redress was directly available from the homeowner.1 1 4 Justice Garibaldi contended that the majority's failure or inability to
adequately define the new standard will lead to further needless
litigation."1 5
The dissenting justice further chastised the majority for its failure to recognize the conflict of interest that arises when a broker,
as an agent for the homeowner, is required to reveal defects to a
111 Id. at 452, 625 A.2d at 1122 (Clifford, J., concurring). Justice Clifford commented that there was no reason to require the parties to use expert testimony to
establish customary standards governing real estate brokers. Id.
112 Id. (citing Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 252 N.J. Super. 295, 599 A.2d 924
(App. Div. 1991), affd, 132 NJ. 426, 625 A.2d 1110 (1993)). Justice Clifford preferred
the appellate division's reliance on the Restatement of Torts § 383 because judges
and juries had successfully evaluated cases using these principles every day. Id. at 45253, 625 A.2d at 1122; see RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 383 (establishing liability of
persons acting on behalf of the possessor of land). Additionally, the justice criticized
the dissent for attacking the majority's opinion as if it were declaring "open season"
on brokers, rather than imposing a duty during an "open house." Hopkins, 132 NJ. at
453, 625 A.2d at 1122-23 (Clifford, J., concurring).
113 Id. at 453, 625 A.2d at 1123 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissenting justice
attacked the majority's reliance on the philosophical roots of the common law to
change current law by noting the court's failure to use agency law, contract law, or
traditional tort liability. Id.
114 Id. at 454, 625 A.2d at 1123 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). "By converting real estate
brokers into home inspectors," the dissent accused, the majority's position raised
more questions than it provided answers. Id.
115 Id. Thejustice articulated that the concept of fairness requires that the person
owing the duty know exactly what the duty is and how it can be satisfied. Id. Criticizing the majority's vague standard, the dissent questioned:
[M]ust a broker arrive at the site early, inspect the premises and then
post warning signs on all steps, low ceilings, railings, hanging plants,
newly-waxed floors, and other potential "dangerous conditions"? Must
the broker tidy up the house and pick up errant skateboards or banana
peels? Or must the broker escort people who might prefer to look at
the home without an eager salesperson hovering around, so that the
broker can point out all potential safety hazards? Or should the broker
greet the potential purchasers at the door with a list of conceivable
hazards?
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prospective purchaser.1 1 6 The dissent scrutinized the majority's
supporting cases, emphasizing17 that only one other state has actu1
ally imposed broker liability.
Finally, the dissenting justice alleged that the increased cost of
protecting the broker will be passed on to the seller and ultimately
to the buyer."' The dissent stressed that the broker will have no
more incentive to inspect the premises, because his liability will be
protected through insurance, indemnification, or contribution." 9
Justice Garibaldi submitted that the burden of this new standard
will only exacerbate the already expensive and difficult process of
selling a house."
In light of the evolving landscape of landowner liability and
the changing social mores of modern times, the Hopkins court correctly substituted a single duty of care in place of the mechanical
and antiquated common law tripartite classifications. The only surprising element of the court's decision is that it took so long to be
116 Id. at 455, 625 A.2d at 1123-24 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi
pointed out that the broker is an agent of the homeowner and is legally bound by a
fiduciary duty to act in the homeowner's best interest. Id., 625 A.2d at 1123 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 NJ.
528, 553, 236 A.2d 843, 856 (1967) ("The broker was and is looked upon as a fiduciary
and is required to exercise fidelity, good faith and primary devotion to the interests of
his principal.") (citations omitted).
117 Hopkins, 132 NJ. at 455, 625 A.2d at 1124 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Garibaldi declared that only Washington had imposed liability on a broker for injuries sustained by potential buyers at an open house. Id. (citing Jarr v.
Seeco Constr. Co., 666 P.2d 392 (Wash. Ct. App. (1983)). InJarr,the plaintiff and his
wife attended an open house at a condominium complex that was under construction. Jar, 666 P.2d at 393. The real estate broker's agent met the couple at the construction site, but did not accompany them while they inspected the unfinished unit.
Id. In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant real
estate broker, the Washington Court of Appeals concluded that the reasonableness of
the broker's conduct presented a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 396. The court
of appeals reasoned that the definition of a "possessor of land[,]" that is one who
occupies and controls the land, included a broker. Id. at 394-95. Therefore, the Jair
court imposed on the broker the duty to exercise reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions with regard to invitees. Id. at 395.
118 Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 456, 625 A.2d at 1124 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting). The dissent
asserted that the broker will defray his costs by obtaining additional insurance. Id.
The broker in turn, the justice proffered, will simply add this new cost to his commission. Id. Ultimately, the dissenting justice concluded, the homeowner will increase
the selling price of the house, therefore leaving the buyer with the additional cost. Id.

119 Id.
120 Id. Moreover, the dissent criticized the majority's imposition of a single standard of care on the broker for adding to litigation and increasing paperwork during
the process of selling a house. Id. Therefore, the dissent characterized the majority's
opinion as "unnecessary, impractical, unreasonable, potentially expensive, and unen-

forceable .

. . ."

Id. at 456-57, 625 A.2d at 1124 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
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resolved. 121 This definite change in the common law, however,
does not come free of its own questionability. The Hopkins court
did not rely on one particular case to support its abrogation of the
common law classes, and cited cases that abolished the tripartite
classifications as a whole, as well as cases that have only eliminated
the licensee-invitee distinction. 122 Therefore, the court failed to
clarify whether a trespasser is also afforded the "reasonable care
against foreseeable harms" standard. Additionally, the court did
not specifically address the concurrent duties of the judge and jury
in determining if the standard has been met or if the status classifi123
cations are still a factor to be considered in the analysis.
While some commentators have criticized the movement away
from the mechanical status approach because of its unpredictability, 124 the reasonable person standard has successfully satisfied the
law of negligence for almost a century. 12 The social values and
economy of the United States are no longer based on an agrarian
society or feudal norms. Our modern, urbanized, and complex society has so evolved that a higher value is placed on human safety
121 In the past, the legal community has recognized the NewJersey Supreme Court
for its revolutionary and pro-plaintiff stances. See, e.g., Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc.,
132 N.J. 587, 603, 626 A.2d 445, 453 (1993) (declaring that employer is liable for
sexual harassment of employee); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
372, 161 A.2d 69, 77 (1960) (imposing strict liability in tort for defective products).
Changes in the common law classes, however, were suggested as long ago as 1957. See
Dribben, supra note 82, at 199 (calling for abolition of licensee-invitee distinction).
122 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text for discussion of the court's reliance on these cases.
123 See Dribben, supra note 82, at 199 (suggesting that the jury should be asked
"[c]ould an ordinary, reasonable and prudent man, under the same or similar circumstances, standing in the shoes of the defendant, foresee a risk of some harm to the
particular plaintiff?").
124 See Edwards & Jerome, supra note 3, at 167-68 ("Admittedly, abrogation of the
common law scheme may necessitate loss of certainty in premises liability cases .... ") ;
see also Hawkins, supranote 49, at 61, 63 (asserting that removal of common law categories may allow unnecessary cases to be funnelled to the jury, who may not be able to
fix appropriate limits on premises liability); Britton, supra note 39, at 367 (noting that
the practical result of employing a single standard of care will be to allow more cases
to be decided by a jury rather than dismissed on a motion for summary judgment);
Johnston, supra note 71, at 395 (warning that abolition of common law categories will
eventually result in new rules under a single standard of care); Payne, supra note 35,
at 374 ("The greater the discretion conferred on the court, the more uncertain the
outcome of a case will be, and therefore the higher will be the proportion of cases
that go to trial instead of being settled out of court."); cf Henderson, supra note 43, at
526 ("Our common law process has survived for hundreds of years, and it is probably
presumptuous to assume it should finally have met its match in the concept of negligence-based tort liability.").
125 See Dribben, supra note 82, at 200 (stating that general negligence principles
"have been engendered into the American law").
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and protection than on private property rights. As such, the determination of landowner liability should rest in the jury's application
of a single community standard of reasonable care.
Kerrie Restieri-Heslin

